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American Legal Theory and American Legal Education: A Snake
Swallowing its Tail?
By John Henry Schlegel
My story is a story about American Legal Realism. It is part of an attempt to understand
what Realism was by addressing the question, "Why is the study of Realism a subject of
legal history and not of current events?" Of course, the "answer" to such a question is
made up of several partial answers, of which what follows is but one. Others would talk
about the relationship between legal doctrine and capitalist economic development or
about legal theory and political philosophy or about legal theory and legal practice, to
name a few examples. However, this partial answer can best be approached by examining
how a simple idea about law - the liberal idea of the rule of law in its guise as the "rule
theory of law" - has had in its rise and in its demise an impact on legal education and to
attempt to understand why that is so. My attempt however, requires that I start my story
back aways with Christopher Columbus Langdell and the Harvard Law School.
A. The Classical Order 1870-1920
Langdell is one of the more obvious enigmas of legal intellectual history. Tony Chase 2 and
Tom Grey to the contrary notwithstanding, Grant Gilmore was right. Langdell was gentle,
essentially stupid man who clung onto a simple idea with all the tenacity that only the
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A., Northwestern University, 1964; J.D., University of
Chicago, 1967. Author: From the Yale Experience, 28 Buffalo Law Review 459 (1979); American Legal Realism and
Empirical Social Science, The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 Buffalo Law Review 195 (1980); Notes Toward
and Intimate, Affectionate and Opinionated History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stanford Law
Review 391 (1984); Langdell's Legacy: or the Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 Stanford Law Review 1517 (1984).
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (1995); Of Duncan, Peter and Thomas Kuhn, 22 Cardozo Law
Review 1061 (2001); But Pierre, If We Can't Think Normatively, What are We to Do? 57 Miami Law Review 955
(2003); CLS Wasn't Killed By a Question, 58 Alabama Law Review 967(2007); Law and Economic Change the Short
Twentieth Century in 3 Cambridge History of Law In America 563 (2008); On the Many Flavors of Capitalism, or
Reflections on Schumpeter's Ghost, 56 Buffalo Law Review 965 (2009).
1 Norbert Reich supplied this elegant substitute for all sorts of awkward phrases.
2 Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329 (1979); Anthony Chase, Origins of
Modern Professional Education: The Harvard Case Method Conceived as Clinical Instruction in Law, 5 NOVA L. J.
323 (1981)
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983)
4 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977)
German Law Journal
stupid can muster. Nor can Langdell's revolution be saved by attaching it to Harvard's
president, Charles Eliot. 5 Eliot may have known something about scientific education,
including medical education, but he could have known nothing about legal education if he
believed that studying cases was a clinical education or that a law library was a laboratory.
And yet, Langdell and Eliot intuitively understood something that few others did in the
years after the Civil War. They understood one way, at least, of fitting legal education to
what would be, with their help of course, the dominant legal theory of the time.
Robert Gordon6, Tom Grey and Duncan Kennedy8 each have attempted to isolate this
dominant late-nineteenth century legal theory that Gordon calls liberal legal science. I
have nothing against these versions; I nevertheless find a later version of the theory, that
of Joseph Beale in the mid-twentieth century, like Bach's belated exemplification of the
baroque, clearer for my purposes. In his great treatise on the conflict of laws, Beale argued
that law was made up of three things: principles, "the largest portion even of the particular
law of a state", standards and rules, some of which are "quite arbitrary in their
operation".9 These three things, however, are not generally arbitrary; rather, they "tend to
form a single homogeneous philosophical system".10 "Changes made by legislation and by
wrong decisions", by the arbitrary pieces of the law which are respectively "small" and
"uncommon", "constitute the greater part of the peculiar local law of any jurisdiction, as
distinguished from the doctrine of the prevailing legal system". 1It is this prevailing legal
system, "the common law", "general bodies of principle [which] exist and are capable of
scientific development", that is the subject of study in "any law school of more than local
12importance". Due to the great proliferation of decisions, "[m]ore and more the
development of the law by decisions has been complimented by a development of the law
through the study and experience of scholars".13 This general system, which "exists apart
from positive law", and thus "neither by legislation nor by judicial legislation can be
Which Tony Chase has clearly tried to do in his work.
6 Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS
AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983)
See, supra, note 3.
8 Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal
Thought in America, 1850-1940, in RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3 (Stephen Spitzer ed., 1980)
JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 2 (1935)
10 Id., 23.
11 Id., 25.
12 Id., 27-28.
13 Id., 28.
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changed", is in force because it is accepted as in force.14 Yet, it is certain that the common
law changes; "[T]his must be true, or the science of law, differing from all other sciences,
would be unprogressive".15 Change in the law comes from "change of the professional
opinion about it", a professional opinion that is molded by the judges and by the law
teachers and other "legal thinkers who are not judges".16 But no matter what changes are
made in law, a legal system must have certain characteristics. It must be general, "since
justice requires equality of treatment for all persons, and this means generality"; universal,
since "it is unthinkable in a civilized country that any act should fall outside of the domain
of law"; continuous, since "society needs to know the law in advance of judicial action
upon it"; just, since "it is impossible at every moment to depend upon brute force for the
administration and enforcement of law"; and predictable, since "the principle function of
law is the prevention of disputes" by giving advice to "clients as to the quality of
contemplated acts".'7
As a description of the American legal system in operation in 1935 when this was written,
Beale's construction is fantabulous and yet it is a remarkable piece of work for the way
that it fits into the ideology of the larger society and into Langdell's law school. Let me back
into the matter of the relationship between the rule theory of law as a form of liberal legal
science and the ideology of the larger society by looking more carefully at Langdell.
Although Tony Chase seems to have decided that Eliot was the dominant force,'8 it is
Langdell who interests me more. Reading Langdell's annual reports in an eye-opener. The
man was a numerologist, a sort of primitive version of Holmes' man of statistics, if not
economics. Langdell's peculiar, very sensitive seismograph charted and attempted to
explain the most minute variations in enrollment, tuition receipts, library acquisitions and
the like.'9 Indeed, while it is asserted that he spoke so little because of his faith in his
system,20 the truth is that he spoke much, though very little about legal education and that
14 Id., 30.
15 Id., 39.
16 Id., 40.
17 Id., 45-48.
18 Origins of Modern Professional Education (note 2). But cf. Anthony Chase, Lawyer Training in the Age of the
Department Store, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 893, 906-08 (1983).
1 See, e.g., Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF HARVARD
COLLEGE 1883-84, 100-107; Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND
TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE 1884-85, 112-16; Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, IN ANNUAL REPORTS OF
THE PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE 1887-88, 92-105.
20 Eugene Wambaugh, Professor Langdell-A View of His Career, 20 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1906)
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much of what he said about legal education was absolutely inconsequential.21 Indeed, I
seriously doubt that Langdell really understood anything about the revolution that was
brought about in his name, except that he had fathered a new subspecies of lawyer - the
full-time academic.22 That is, unless, one assumes that the old man really believed that law
was a system of rules to be applied to concrete cases.
I confess that I have always had a hard time deciding what I think that Langdell, and here I
use him as an eponym for an entire generation of elite lawyers, believed. Surely, this
generation talked as if law was a system of rules - they spent enough time looking for the
historical origins of these rules and trying to come to a "true" understanding of them. And
yet it was simultaneously clear that the rules were really not the important elements in the
Langdellian system, much less the cases, the supposed lynchpin of the case method. It was
the principles that animated the system, that tested the rules and the cases.23 The law was
thus better described as a system of principles than a system of rules.
I doubt that Langdell managed to fool himself and others about the lack of difference
between a system of rules and a system of principles. For me the then common distinction
between arguing a case on principle and arguing it on precedent demonstrates that others
understood the difference. And yet, and yet what? And yet at times Langdell and others
talked as if they did not know the difference. Perhaps such is what ideologies are made of,
things one knows but does not know, and yet seeing law, and especially theories about
law, as ideology has its problems. Who is listening? Ideologies imply the presence of
auditors and if the ideology is for other lawyers and elite friends, somehow the effort
seems wasted. Law as an elaborate mental teddy bear, as bed time stories for lazy lawyers,
strikes me, quite simply, as implausible.
21 Langdell wrote about 200 pages of annual reports. In addition he penned the famous CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
LANGDELL, PREFACE To A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS VII(1871); Christopher Columbus Langdell, The
Harvard Law School, 1869-1894, 2 HARV. GRAD. MAG. 490 (1894); Speech at 250th Anniversary Dinner, 3 L. Quar.
Rev. 123 (1887); and Speech at the 25th Anniversary of Christopher Columbus Langdell as Dean of Harvard Law
School, 29 AM. L. REV. 605 (1895). Out of this only the Preface; the 250th Anniversary Dinner containing the
famous passages on legal science, portions of the reports of 1873-74 (importance of division into classes, library
as laboratory), 1976-77 (admission to bar in New York, division of bar into attorneys and counsellors) and 1886-87
(importance of a thorough professional education in the science of law, necessity for scholarships to encourage
such study); and the Deanship anniversary dinner (listing accomplishments) can even vaguely be said to have
anything to do with legal education. Of this, only the brief passages on legal science, which are hopelessly
confused can be said to be other than decanal clap trap.
22 The Harvard Law School 1869-1894 (note 21), 479-98
23 Robert Gordon was the first person to point this out to me. A good illustration is found in the story about
Langdell's equity course where he found Lumley v. Wagner to be simply wrong. See, Joseph H. Beale, Professor
Langdell - His later Teaching Days, 20 HARV. L. REV. 9, 10 (1906), and in the oft quoted statement, "The vast
majority [of cases] are useless, and worse than useless, for any purpose of systematic study". PREFACE To A
SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (note 21), viii.
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Still the question of audience is important. Concededly, the rule of law is an ideology, a
shared understanding about political order, that, like all such understandings, makes some
things acceptable and others not. But this ideology, in its guise of the rule of theory of law,
cannot plausibly be described as being directed by the lawyers out into the community.
Rather it is deep within the community down to the level of older sisters bossing younger
brothers by telling them to "buckle up" because "its the law" or telling their fathers to
"slow down", speeding is "against the law". But in this guise, the rule theory of law is for
lawyers a rather simpleminded thing, implausible as a serious explanation of their work.
Yet it cannot be wholly ignored. To the extent that an ideological justification of a lawyer's
own activities is necessary, it is, if not essential, at least desirable, that the adopted
justification, the explanation of the self to the self, fit tolerably well within the larger
ideology of the community. It is this tension between the ideology of the larger community
and the construction of a narrower justification of the lawyer's work that gives Langdell's
ideas and all of late nineteenth century legal thought its peculiar half in, half out of focus
quality, the sense of comfortably saying contradictory things one after another. For law
can't both be the application of rules derived from cases and the application of principles
that prove some of the cases to be wrong. Nevertheless, if the dominant ideology sees law
as the application of pre-existing rules by judges in an even-handed way, the Langdellian
theory is not a bad attempt to fit the reality of chaotic often contradictory decisions of not
always beyond reproach judicial officers into the ideology. The notion of law as a body of
principles somehow both abstracted from, and independent of, actual decisions, which
principles are elaborated by an identifiable "method" and applied by the judges usually,
but not invariably, correctly, may be a brooding omnipresence, but it both preserves law
application and recognizes actual diversity. Moreover, at the more abstract level of
political theory this notion "solves" questions about the justifiability of the decisions of an
unelected judiciary - of their acceptability within a democratic political system, their
freedom from the taint of personal or group interest - by combining authoritative
premises for decision with a determinative technique of decision. Legal science as method,
"the extraction of general principles by means of historical study [of cases] and the
arrangement of them in rational relation to one another", 2 4 provided both the premises
and the technique. The process of abstraction of principles from the particulars of cases
yielded the premises with, of course, the intervention of a purifying lens (a combination of
a critical theory of history, the appeal of examples from comparable institutions and the
natural reason of the well educated lawyer)25 to free principle from the "warping by bad
precedent", and then was mirrored in the process of application of principles so purified to
cases. Together the two were the process of legal reasoning, the technique that yielded
the rule of law.
24 See, supra, note 6, 87.
25 Id., 84, 88.
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This model parallels the substantive side of Langdell's law school. The pure private law
curriculum that he designed was supposed to allow the student to derive the applicable
legal principle from a multitude of narrowly relevant cases, often arranged in historical
order and to apply the principles thus derived in the newly instituted course exams and the
26more ancient moot courts2. It was thus a curriculum cleansed both of inhibiting local
legislation and of warping precedent. Of the rest of the Langdellian reforms, the most
notable, the Socratic dialog, harkened back to the catechistical recitation sessions of the
New England colleges. It was hardly important to Langdell, who abandoned it as his
eyesight failed, 27 but may have been a serious educational innovation in law for it moved
the question of justification more to the center of the student-teacher relationship.28 The
longer, three year curriculum and the required college degree are part of the other
conscious innovation that Langdell made the development of the new sub-pieces in the
profession, the full-time law teacher.29 The old man considered it one of his great
3 0innovations and it surely was for it was the full-time academics on both sides of the
31Atlantic who put together the treatises and in the United States, the casebooks, an
innovation designed to limit the wear and tear on the library,3 2 that entombed the
substantive program of legal science. However, the relationship of these scholars to
Langdellian legal theory and thus to the rule theory of law takes a while to explain.
The reference to law teachers which sticks out somewhat uncomfortably in Beale's
argument is, of course, a clue to the fact that Langdell could not have brought forth "his"
revolution by himself. He needed and received the assistance from over one hundred
young, and few not so young, teachers of law throughout the land each of whom brought
the case method to his school in the ten years on either side of the turn of the century.33
Creating this corps of fulltime teachers of law to replace the part-time practitioner-
teachers who had populated American law schools in the years before 1910 was Langdell's
most significant achievement and one he recognized long before it was clear that this
26 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850'S TO THE 1980's (1983), 35-42, 51-57
27 THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1817-1917 (1918), 36
28 Al Katz pointed this out to me years ago.
29 See, supra, note 26, 38, 60-61.
3o See, supra, note 22.
31 As David Sugarman has now made crystal clear. David Sugarman, Legal Theory, The Common Law Mind and The
Making of the Text Book Tradition, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 26 (William Twining ed., 1986).
32 See, Christopher Columbus Langdell, Annual Report on the Law School, in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT A D
TREASURER OFHARVARD COLLEGE 1890-91, 104, 116.
See, John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The
Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL ED. 311 (1985).
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change would carry the day.34 However, the growth of Midwestern and western states
brought with it the establishment of public universities throughout the land, each of which,
in emulation of Michigan, expressed the need to have a state law school. These schools
and a few of the larger, private universities, were the ones who most quickly adopted the
case system of legal education, largely as they aped elite status and hired graduates of
Harvard, Columbia and Chicago who had studied under that system.
Elsewhere, of course, legal education, particularly private legal education unaffiliated or
quite loosely affiliated with a university, was growing like crazy as well.35 Indeed,
proportionately, this segment of legal education was growing more rapidly than the state
schools and the more elite private schools that had also followed Langdell's lead. The great
increase in urban population, due in part to immigration from Europe, was accompanied
by a great increase in the demand for legal education, particularly part-time, night school
legal education. Teaching in most of these schools was pure, indeed occasionally stridently
pure, pre-Langdell text and lecture and the schools personned largely by part-time
36practitioner-teachers. The course of study at these schools was often the same length as,
and thus effectively shorter than, the course for full-time day students at the more elite
schools and the cost, once the opportunity costs of foregone income are considered, thus
less than, or at most equal to, the cost of a legal education at even a public law school. The
economic threat to the elite schools with full-time faculty, and to practitioners generally,
from cheap ways of entering the profession was thus quite real.
Not surprisingly, the bar and the elite schools attempted to choke off the avenues of cheap
access to the profession, though for different reasons.37 The bar, of course, was interested
in price fixing; it wished to raise, or at least maintain, price by decreasing supply. The role
of the law professors was more complex. They too wished to protect their market; a world
full of cut rate versions of their law schools made it difficult to justify their relatively
privileged position. So uniting with the bar to require that each and every law student have
a college degree and spend three full-time years, or their equivalent, in law school, the
obvious "standard" both groups strived for, was in the interest of the academics and yet
34 The issue was still a live one as late as 1910. Langdell's strongest statements came fifteen years earlier. See,
supra, note 22.
See, supra, note 26, in the source of most of this paragraph.
See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Challenge to Hierarchy in Legal Education: Suffolk and the
Night Law School Movement, in RESEARCH IN LAW, DEVIANCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL,189 (1985).
What follows is a summary of the argument in Schlegel, supra, note 33. That in turn draws heavily on MAGALI
LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977) and JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICAN (1976). I have also wrestled with this problem in John Henry Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy, or the
Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STANFORD LAW REVIEW (Stan. L. Rev.) 1517 (1984). I confess that I suspect that my
friends in C.L.S. may well find this argument to be too functionalist and for this reason have chosen to ignore it.
On this question see, infra, note 39.
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this is only part of the story. Price fixing only works for standardized products, like No. 2
bituminous coal or Saudi Arabian Light Crude Oil. But, given that legal jobs and legal skills
are anything but uniform, many different kinds or types of legal education might have
been appropriate for law students, depending on the type of practice each wanted to
enter. Thus, unless one wishes to settle for a part of the entire market, as Langdell may
have initially wished to do,3 in order to gain control of a market in law knowledge one
"needs" to establish a single legal education assertedly appropriate to the entire market.
The uniformity of degree requirements went part way toward solving this problem, yet as
anyone who has observed an undergraduate school will soon notice, a program of uniform
graduation requirements, such as would have satisfied the practicing lawyers' needs,
standing alone can turn out quite varying graduates - historians and literatures,
sociologists and biologists. The time, and thus money, spent in satisfying requirements can
be spent in quite different ways, since it is devoted to an intangible knowledge. So, to
effectively control the market, one has to control what is taught; the intellectual content
that is put into the program of study. Here the content of the Langdellian theory of law had
a direct use.
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Annual Report on Law School, in ANNUAL REPORTS OF PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF
HARVARD COLLEGE 1876-77, 82, 88-92.
To speak of "needs" raises the ugly question of "functionalism". I use "needs" with a certain malice. I am tired
of hearing functionalism dismissed as if it were somehow stupid to assert that the products of human activity
such as law have or serve functions. While I can understand how one might be upset at the politics of the
functionalists of the Post-World War II period, that upset is not an objection to functionalist explanations. A
hammer and a crescent wrench may both be used to drive nails into wood. But a bit of work at the task is likely to
demonstrate that one of these tools was designed to, is functional for the indicated task and I dare say that an
anthropologist in 10,000 years will have little difficulty coming to the same conclusion.
Now, of course, some products of human activity, like legal education or negligence, are substantially more
complicated to dope out than hammers and crescent wrenches. Indeed, it may be said that such complex
products have multiple functions. (Then again, so do tools. A crescent wrench may be used to drive nails and, as I
just checked out, a claw hammer, thought not a ball peen hammer, to tighten bolts and nuts.) But that only
implies that the task of understanding the function is more difficult for complex entities.
There is the problem of necessary relationship, I suppose. To say, as I am saying above, that the structure of
legal education had a function is not to say that only this structure could have served that function. State
legislation directly limiting entry into the profession or a reinvigorated bar coupled with stringent, essentially class
biased apprenticeship requirements could have done as well. And understanding why one route rather than
others was taken in a society often tells much about that society. (Here the legislative route was unavailable
because the relatively less elite legislatures would not go along; they even were unwilling to go along with the
lesser entry requirements sought by the law schools. The apprenticeship route was unavailable because the
corporate bar simply had no time to train the myriad of apprentices it needed; its desire to support university
based education was a recognition that it did not wish the task.) But the existence of hypothetical alternatives or
even of similar societies where different alternatives were actually taken does not undermine an assertion about
the function of a product of human activity, at least unless one is caught in the clutches of a rather virulent
sociological or historical positivism.
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There are many possible contents to the notion of what it is to be lawyer, all the way from
40
simple scrivener to the public statesman of Ciceronian virtue. Many of these notions have
been trotted out from time to time. The Langdellian version, the lawyer as the expositor of
legal principles collected and rationalized through the use of legal science, had many
advantages. First, as a matter of pure social status it was far from unimportant to this
nascent professional group, traditionally looked down upon as "failed" practitioners or
"retired" judges, that its intellectual product mirrored the work of the judge. The claim to
equal partnership in the work of the legal profession as a whole was often heard at this
time and generally based on the unity of the work of the judge and the jurist.41 Second, it
was surely important that the Langdellian vision was dominant, or more aptly gaining
dominance, at the time. One did not have to blaze a path but rather only swell a parade.
Third, the Langdellian vision was useful in the university.
Useful how? During these years the American University, as we know it, was taking
42shape. Specialized academic disciplines unknown to the New England college, such as
psychology, economics or history, chemistry, physics, or biology, English, modern
languages, or fine arts, were creating themselves.4 3 The process, known by the
unilluminating, but nevertheless accurate, title "professionalization", was producing a
balkanization of knowledge as each piece of the academy attempted to do what the
lawyer's were attempting: carve out a piece of the academic turf that would allow that
group exclusive control over the production of knowledge in that area.44 Again, constrict
supply to increase price. The law professors needed to create a market, not from scratch as
did the sociologists, but in the sense of excluding other potential producers of the same
good from doing so. So in terms of exclusive control, the academic lawyers faced the same
problem as all other nascent disciplines.
Here, in terms of establishing exclusive control, is where the various notions of what it is to
be a lawyer made some difference. The notion of the lawyer as scrivener really cut the
academics out; teaching a handicraft was inappropriate to the university as Langdell
himself noticed. At the same time too broad a role risked other intellectual poachers.
40 See, supra, note 6, 82-87 gives content to the notion of the lawyers as the public statesman of Ciceronian
virtue.
41 See, supra, note 33, 321.
42 See, generally, LAURENCE VEYSEY, EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (1965).
43 See, supra, note 33, 313-14 for a rough description of the process and for sources on some of these disciplines.
44 Id., 319-25. A similar, though by no means identical argument to what follows for the balance of this paper is
Arthur Jacobson, Modern American Jurisprudence and the Problem of Power, 6 CARDOZo L. REV. 693 (1985). For its
sheer elegance and the power of its categories, Jacobson's paper repays careful reading. At the same time, I am
not convinced that the process we both seek to describe is as exclusively intellectual as his paper implies nor do I
think he would be convinced that the process is an heavily social as I think it is.
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Ciceronian virtue suggested that rhetoric was a relevant skill, maybe moral philosophy;
maker of public policy suggested that economics and political science might be central.
However, Langdell's world of the private law litigator, his rules neatly ordered and logically
defensible, suggested no other claimants. It was at once too technical for any other
academic discipline to claim and simultaneously too general, indeed airy and theoretical,
for any practicing lawyer to suggest as matter appropriate to an apprenticeship. As the
content for a discipline it was a good match to the academics' need. And the rhetoric of
legal science made it better still. Legal science was a method, or at least appeared to be
one, and an identifiable method was the hallmark of any discipline in the academy.45
Equally importantly it was a method so tedious and time consuming that the practicing bar
could be expected to leave it to the academics and simply reap its fruits. Capitalizing on
this division of intellectual labor seemed easy, especially since the rest of the university
bore the same relationship to the law school as the society at large did to the legal
profession. If legal science in its guise as the rule theory of law fit tolerably well with the
rule of law ideology in the society at large then, though adopted for a different purpose, it
nevertheless ought to fit well in the academy also. And so it did.
Much of the intellectual product of these years before World War 1, for example, the great
treatises, Wigmore on Evidence and Williston on Contracts, were the primary monuments
to this ideal of legal science and thus a part of the creation of the identity of the law
professors. But the production of the first generation of casebooks, most notable of which
is, of course, Gray's six volumes on property,46 but also including such lesser lights as
Bohlen's torts book 47 and Huffcut's Agency book, 48 was part of the same project. The
casebook presented the law, the rules, scientifically. And not all of these attempts were
successful either; Wigmore's torts book clearly got it wrong and was left by the wayside. 49
Other activities contributed in a less direct way. Great gobs of print were spilled on
standardization of courses, degrees and libraries.50 Efforts were made to increase the
intellectual range of the professoriate through publication of materials on European legal
45 See, supra, note 33; Schlegel (note 37) provides support for this proposition. As a brief supplement, I would
suggest that the failure of political science and sociology to identify a method appropriate to the discipline
accounts for much of the sense that neither is a discipline, as well as for the attraction of a general statistical,
empirical method for both disciplines.
46 JOHN GRAY, SELECT CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (1988-92)
47 FRANCIS BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1915)
48 ERNEST HUFFCUT, CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (1895)
49 JOHN WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS WITH NOTES AND A SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES (1911-12). A study of
why this book was rejected might well illuminate the contours of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
legal academic's intellectual world.
5o See, supra, note 33, 321.
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history and philosophy.5  Major theoretical attempts were offered by Thayer and later
Ames to describe the nature of the work of the law professor. Thayer emphasized
"52research, and gave scant attention to "the difficult main work of teaching'. Ames, six
years later, put a greater emphasis on teaching young men how to "think like a lawyer".53
Simultaneously much work was put directly into raising standards by increasing the
number of years of pre-legal, and of legal, education, raising the minimum size of faculty,
decreasing the maximum number of courses taught, and, of course, increasing the size of
libraries.54 And much effort went into keeping the teaching of law the teaching of pure law,
as is testified to by both the famous Beale/Ames correspondence with William Rainey
Harper over the wish of Ernest Freund to inject such novelties as international law,
administrative law, criminology, finance, railroad transportation, accounting and banking
into the curriculum at the new University of Chicago Law School55 and the long fight at
Columbia over that school's relationship with the School of Political Science.s5
The more narrowly jurisprudential writings of the time were much of the same stripe. Here
the best bridge into that literature is Wesley N. Hohfeld's, A Vital School of Jurisprudence
and Law, the grandest plan for a law school ever concocted.57 Recognizing six varieties of
jurisprudence - historical, comparative, analytic, teleological, legislative and empirical;
several neglected aspects to the law students' education, including the required courses in
legal history and jurisprudence and required reading in the history of the legal profession;
and the need for a department devoted to the "civic and cultural study of legal institutions
by non-professional college students",ss Hohfeld proposed nothing less than a temple to
the law professoriate. Roscoe Pound's theory of interests is of much the same stripe. 9
51 No adequate discussion of the impact, if any, of either the Continental Legal History Series or the Modern Legal
Philosophy series is available, perhaps, because there was none. The latter is treated briefly in John Henry
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO
LAW REVIEW (Buff. L. Rev.) 195, 202 n. 20.
52 James Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARV. L. REV. 169, 183 (1895)
James Ames, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 354 (1913); James Ames,
Remarks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 16 (1907). The
precise origin of the phrase "thinking like a lawyer" is unknown to me.
54 See, supra, note 21, 92-103.
Id., 39-40.
Foundation for Research, in LEGAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 85-89 (1955).
Wesley Hohfeld, A Vital School of Law and Jurisprudence: Have Universities Awakened to the Enlarged
Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 76 (1914).
58 Id., 128.
Pound's work, scattered throughout the pages of the law reviews, is collected in his multi-volume treatise,
Jurisprudence (1959) which is largely a compendium of his original articles, complete with original footnotes, with
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Pound argued that the point of law is to secure interests of people or groups or
governments. Interests, that is "the claims or demands or desires for which or about which
the law has to make some provision if civilization is to be maintained or furthered and
society is not to be disrupted or dissolved", need to be first inventoried, generalized, and
classified, then one has to "select and determine the interests which the law should
recognize", fix their limits, "weight the means by which the law may secure interests", and
"work out principles of valuation of interests".60 That is a mighty tall order. Indeed an
heroic task fit for a whole generation of law professors.
Pound's actual execution of the task is, however, instructive. Other than for some work on
the means of securing interests, a subject curiously shifted to a negative - the limits of
effective legal action - Pound stopped at classification, which is not to underestimate the
compendiousness of that classification. Individual interests were divided into those of
personality - the physical person, freedom of will, honor and reputation, privacy and
sensibility, and belief and opinion; of domestic relations; and of substance - control of
corporeal things, freedom of industry and contract, claims to promised advantage, claims
to be secured against outsiders in economically advantageous relations with others,
freedom of association and continuity of employment. Public interests, in comparison,
were comparatively more limited, confined as they were to the interests of the state as a
juristic person - again matters of personality and substance, and as a guardian of social
interests. Social interests were, however, more elaborate - general security, security of
social institutions, general morals, conservation of social resources, general progress and
61the individual life. In contrast to this rather sloppy teleological jurisprudence, consider
Hohfeld's more elegant, but no less grand, scheme of analytical jurisprudence. Hohfeld's
Fundamental Legal Conceptions was nothing less than attempt to explain "all possible
kinds of jural (i.e., legal or equitable) interests" as an "aid in the understanding and in the
solution of practical, everyday problems of the law". 62 His efforts led to the production of
two tables:
only limited new material. His version of the theory of interests is contained in vol. 3 from pages 5-341. NATHAN
ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959) 3, 5-341 (1959).
6o Id., 16, 22.
61 Id., 101-341.
62 Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 20
(1913)
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and a surprising amount of technical commentary.
The precise details of either system are less important than the overall activity. Both Pound
and Hohfeld were busy doing legal science as Langdell, Thayer, and Ames had adjured
them to do and in ways these elders would have understood. The object set out was to
establish a discipline and then set to work in that discipline. But not just any discipline. The
discipline of law, pure law. Thus, Hohfeld's work was in fact limited to "judicial reasoning",
primarily in cases trusts and other equitable relations. And the grandest part of his vital
school, the one devoted to jurisprudence, was in fact a school for training law professors;
mere lawyers went to the school of law where torts, contracts and property were taught.
Similarly, Pound's scheme is essentially one centered in common law. When he had to
actually look at a legislatively created interest, for example, in "continuity of employment"
64under the Wagner Act, he was essentially unable to do so. And likewise when he came to
the point of having to value interests he could offer a notable caution, still lost on all today:
one must be careful to compare interests "on the same plane. If we put one as an
individual interest and the other as a social interest we may decide the question in
advance in one very way of putting it".65 But, on the precisely relevant, indeed crucial,
point of how to value interests once on the same plane he had to admit that the search for
a method "is futile" and so lapsed into a jurisprudential schmorgasbord of alternative
66methods. For both men, the system was grand, but it hid a rather narrow heart of
common law adjudication.
Of course today, Pound's willingness to recognize that legal method simpliciter was not
determinative in valuing interests is what seems important, what makes him seem in some
ways modern, just as his efforts at recognizing social interests and his early assertion that
there were in fact causes in the law to the popular dissatisfaction with the administration
of justice, that make him in political terms progressive. Similarly, Hohfeld's system surely
helped lay bare the way that legal science in practice manipulated its basic terms to come
6 Id., 30.
64 See, supra, note 59, 233-35.
6 Id., 328.
Id., 330.
Nathan Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in 29
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 400 (1906).
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out with desired results. 6 Yet, one would be mistaken if one were to over emphasize these
matters. Both men are thoroughly locked in the world of Langdell's legal science and of the
professionalization of the law professoriate.
How deeply locked in that world both men were can be seen from Hohfeld's reaction to
the work of a colleague and contemporary at Stanford, Joseph W. Bingham. In 1913,
Bingham published a piece in the Michigan Law Review entitled "What is the Law?" In a
major sense it is a piece straight out of analytic legal science, for Bingham's stated purpose
as to "focus attention on each of several sorts of elements which exist in the field of legal
study and their essential differences and correlations".69 And yet, as he set out on this
work something strange emerged. "All the ambitious attempts to define this field agree
that it consists of a system of rules and principles enforced by political authority. I believe
that this idea is fundamentally erroneous and that it is a bar to a scientific understanding
of our law".70 And what was this "scientific understanding" Bingham spoke about? It was
not the "organized, generalized knowledge" of Langdell and his followers, but rather "the
acquisition of an ability to predict that described efforts will or will not follow from definite
concrete conditions and forces".71 And so viewed, law is "the concrete operations and
effects", the "external sequences of phenomena" of "authoritative government" which by
"observation, report, inductive and deductive reasoning and the other implements of
scientific investigation, may be generalized into rules and principles". 72 And so Bingham
proposed "a science of law" in place of legal science. In reviewing the piece, the editor of
The Green Bag, a vaguely scholarly legal magazine, commented "Law is thus conceived of
as something objective, as a certain aspect of human society in action, and the jurist's
attitude toward his special field would not be unlike that of the biologist or naturalist".73
He then observed "This interpretation does violence to the plain and natural meaning of
words. By law we clearly mean ... not a real or imaginary state of fact, but a rule or
principle ... Legal science is not concerned with the delineation of external reality, but with
an ideal material which offers a valuation rather than a description of human activity".74 Of
this thoroughly traditional reply to an essentially revolutionary idea, Hohfeld wrote to this
68 See, Joseph Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, Wisc. L. REV.
975, 1050-59 (1982).
6 Joseph Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 12 (1912)
70 Id., 3.
71 Id., 4.
72 Id., 9.
Jurisprudence Not an Objective Science, 25 The Green Bag 74 (1913)
74 Id., 75.
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friend Pound that the author in The Green Bag took Bingham's article "somewhat too
seriously; but that in its general tendency, his criticism was correct".7s
B. American Legal Realism 1920-1940
Such a firm and direct reassertion of the traditional perspective is, of course, the hallmark
of a confident orthodoxy. Yet, in less than fifteen years that orthodoxy would be shattered.
All hell would break loose - its name American Legal Realism. What then was Realism?
Viewed from the traditional perspective of intellectual history as collage, it was the casual,
76if not adventitious, gathering of ideas from Holmes - the prediction theory of law , Gray -
the radical assertion that judges always made law7 ; Pound - the attack on mechanical
jurisprudence and the program of sociological jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of
intere sts, Hohfeld - the destruction of the logic of rights79, and Bingham - the twentieth
century notion of science as empiric not analytic activity8 o, and the forging of these ideas
into a theory of judicial decision-making that emphasized the subjective element in the
judicial process. This notion is not wrong, it just misses the point, as Hohfeld missed the
point of Bingham's article. Realism's meaning is to be found in its social context.
With the coming of the famous Root report of 1922, legitimating the night law schools on
condition that their program be as long as that of the full-time day schools, and accepting
the American Bar Association as the accrediting agency for all law schools, the position of
the legal academic in the legal profession became firmly established.' If the battle for
recognition had not been won unconditionally, at least it had not been lost. The American
Bar Association would work to raise standards in a way that would benefit the academics.
So much for institutional structures. On the intellectual side of law teaching, the great legal
82science project was completed. The law had been given its initial correct formulation;
7 Wesley N. Hohfeld to Roscoe Pound, Feb. 25, 1913, in ROSCOE POUND PAPERS, Harvard Law School Archives,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
7 Oliver Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)
7 JOHN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW (1909), a proposition uttered for a thoroughly conservative purpose.
78 Nathan Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); Nathan Roscoe Pound, The Scope
and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 598 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1912)
7 See, text and supra, note 68.
80 See, supra, text at notes 69-72.
81 See, supra, note 26, 112-123.
82 See, John Henry Schlegel, Searching for Archimedes - Legal Education, Legal Scholarship, and Liberal Ideology,
34 J. LEGAL ED. 103, 107 (1984).
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what was left was to restate it. Beyond that devastatingly tedious, but clearly compelling
project, all that was necessary was to monitor the slow changes in the corpus of law - a
new wrinkle in consideration here, an extension of damage theory there. The prospect
was, I suspect, a rewarding one to the people who had built the edifice, comforting to the
normal scientists among the young, and thoroughly disconcerting to the more
intellectually impatient of any age. Schools were prospering; faculties were slowly
increasing in size, if only in response to demographic trends; and a certain post-war
prosperity and optimism was fueling the dreamers in the academy. "Why dream?" one
might ask. For years it had been drummed into the head of every young law professor that
the proper home of a law school was in a university.83 By 1920 there were actually
universities in virtually every Midwestern state, and some really large universities in the
east. Demography had done for the university as a whole what it had done for the law
schools. And so specialized knowledge abounded. That specialized knowledge was there
for the taking, if only one knew what to do with it.
For a young man of even a mildly left persuasion the "what to do with it" was obvious. This
was a deeply conservative period in American history. The post-war red scare that led to
the Palmer raids and the Sacco-Vanzetti case were all symptoms of an America that was
fat, happy and wanted to be left alone. A reactionary Supreme Court, a war, and a
modicum of formal success had sapped progressivism of much of its force. And yet, there
were still radical alternatives available. Glowing reports still emanated from the great
Soviet experiment; The Masses and similar journals were a notable literary force; and a
real Socialist Party ran real candidates that got substantial votes. For liberals in a
reactionary time, REFORM was the answer. Apply the knowledge of the university to the
solution of social problems.
The idea had been tried in La Follette's Wisconsin, with much noise, if not much success
outside of agricultural technology. But, for law an impediment to reform was legal theory
and, of course, the Supreme Court. Langdellian legal science, didn't really admit of reform.
Oh, it was supposed to provide for change derived from the change in legal opinion based
on changed social circumstances, but as Bob Gordon has argued there was a good deal of
substantive bite to it as well. Legal science aimed "to make all (adult male) persons
juristically equal, to recast all legal obligations so that they derived from an exercise of will,
and to standardize the definition of rights and duties".84 This meant that all private law
liability was to be derived not from status, but from contract seen as promise and from
fault, both seen as objective, not private, manifestations of conduct.85 It also meant that all
statutory enactments were "to provide a more efficient procedural mechanism for
See, Schlegel, supra, note 51, 233-34.
84 See, supra, note 6, 89.
85 Id.
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vindicating common law rights" or otherwise be seen as arbitrary, when not
unconstitutional, elements of local law that kept the law from being a perfect system and
were thus undesirable.
If one wanted to attack this system one could of course attack the doctrinal pieces - formal
equality, objective theory of contract and so on, as had been done by dissenting scholars
since 1890. And such attacks were mounted, but to them were added a new, theoretical
attack on legal science as Beale had described it. Starting with Bingham's attack on legal
science for not being scientific, scholars attacked both aspects of the Langdellian solution
to the problem of political legitimacy. The premises of law were sought to be shown to be
not authoritative and the technique, not determinative. The materials used for this effort
were commonplace enough - Dewey on science and scientific method 8, some Hohfeld,
some Pound, a dollop of Freud 89, a nod to Holmes and Corbin 9o and Cardozo9 l, all ripped
out of context and used for purposes their authors would have disagreed with, but mostly
it was home brew.
Law was not rules; it was politics. As such it needed to be seen and taught in a way that
presented the social issues directly. Thus, the old categories of contract, tort and the like
ought to be dropped and in their place substituted "functional", i.e., showing the functions
performed by the legal institution (all Realists were, at heart, functionalist anthropologists
and institutional economists), categories, like risk bearing and business form and labor law
92or trade regulation9. Substantive reforms, largely legislative in nature, were to be pursued
after applying truly scientific method to the study of social life and legal institutions. The
problem of the automobile accident was to be solved much like workman's
86 Id., 98.
WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); William Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (N.Y.U. L. Rev.) 329 (1985) attempts to develop the notion of a "dissenting tradition" in
American jurisprudence, though in a thoroughly implicit fashion. Twining has used the phrase in conversation for
years. He puts in the class of pre-Realist dissenters, Holmes, Gray, Corbin, Hohfeld, Pound and Cardozo. In
addition to the works of these scholars noted above one needs to recognize BENJAMIN CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922); Arthur Corbin, The Law and the Judges, 3 Yale Review 234 (1914); Nathan Roscoe Pound,
Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. J. 462 (1909).
John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17 (1924) is the usual cite. In fact Dewey's ideas on
science were scattered all over until consolidated in JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC (1938)
Here, I speak of Jerome Frank's attachment to Freud's theory of the unconscious that permeates JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)
9o Corbin, supra, note 87
91 CARDOZO, supra, note 87
92 See, Schlegel, supra, note 51, 208-09.
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93 94compensation, that of improvident credit by tighter bankruptcy law. In general, law was
to be transformed from its role in specifying "combat zones of free conduct in which
individuals might do as they willed without fear of legal reprisal" 95 to that of a positive
96agency of social control.
While all of this was going on at the intellectual level, in the law school's themselves there
was just as much ferment.97 Among the less elite schools there was, of course, the great
and continuing pressure of rising standards, tempered eventually by the monetary
pressures associated with the Great Depression. More pre-legal education, more books,
more teachers all were the talk of the times. At the more elite schools, other than Harvard,
where for a while Pound dealt ruthlessly with innovation,98 the first visible crack in the
teaching orthodoxy of large class, Socratic dialog came with the introduction of seminars
into the curriculum, first for graduate and honors students, then for all students. Selective
admissions, too, had its first highly tentative go-round, a real break from the tradition of
admitting all who could pay and then flunking out a third. Columbia tried a wholesale
curriculum revision designed to switch from assuming or ignoring knowledge of, to
explicitly presenting, the "nonlegal social structure"; to shift focus from appellate opinions;
and to focus on statutory law. And actual empirical research got carried by law professors
working in law schools.99 Equally important, the first total, sustained criticism of academic
legal education by an insider since Langdell's revolution was penned: Llewellyn's On What's
Wrong with So-Called Legal Education.' 00 He found it "inept, factory-ridden, wasteful,
defective, and empty" since "not rules, but doing, is what we seek to train men for" and
the doing had changed radically from the "blurred composite photograph of the country-
plus-city lawyer of about 1870" that was in the mind of "the great case-book pioneers".101
It would be a mistake even to suggest that the Realist's critique, for that is what it was, and
educational reforms, limited as they were, escaped criticism or triumphed over night. In
time, seminars spread everywhere, as did selective admissions, but at least in the first year
See, John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979), 532-38
94 Id., 522-32, 541-42.
See, supra, note 6, 88.
Id., 94-96.
Much of what follows in this paragraph summarizes R. Stevens, supra, note 26, at 172-199.
Id., 136-37.
See, Schlegel (notes 51 and 93).
100 Karl Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COL. L. REV. 65 (1935)
101 Id., 653.
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program and for much of the balance, at the end of the Realist challenge the curriculum
largely still fit in Langdell's categories - tort, contract, property, crime, corporations and so
on. Empirical legal research inside the law school died out for years and social fact seldom
made it into the law school in any systematic way. And yet it would be wrong to see that
Realism had little impact on legal education. For Realism killed Langdellian legal science.
Although, just as Realism burst on the scene, the American Law Institute's great
Restatement project, the crown of legal science, got underway,102 the Restatements have
tuned out to be more of a tombstone for legal science, than a capstone. From the
beginning, Realism's critics understood the threat. Two examples should suffice. In 1928, at
an A.A.L.S. symposium on "Modern Movements in Legal Education", Joseph Beale,
speaking "for the old men", noted that, "I look back on my work, and I am not dissatisfied
with it".103 He then opined, "Now, there is teaching of law, and there is teaching of other
sciences. We thought that, in order to teach a class of students to become useful members
of the bar, we should not teach them things; we should teach them to be something. In
other words, the object of our endeavors was not to make them think what law is about,
but to make them think like lawyers".104 Realism proposed to teach students to think what
law was about, to adopt the outside, external, objective perspective, treating law as "a
certain aspect of human society in action".105 As such, as Beale understood, Realism
doomed legal science. As a viable intellectual force it was finished if Realism was put into
practice.
A more comprehensive criticism seven years later by Herman Kantorowicz, a refugee from
Nazi terror, is equally poignant in its explicit defense of legal science. o0 Kantorowicz
argued of Realism that , "[t]he substantive theory is that the law is not a body of rules but
of facts; the formal theory, that legal science is not a rational but an empirical science". 10 7
And then observed not that "these theories are simply untrue", but they are
"exaggerations of the truth". 108 Most importantly, these are "doctrines which threaten the
quiet progress of science".109 How can this be true? Curiously, Kantorowicz never says, but
102 See, supra, note 82, 107; Schlegel, supra, note 51, 234.
103 Joseph Beale, Discussion, in HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 53 (1928)
104 Id.
105 See, supra, note 73, 74.
106 Herman Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism about Realism, 43 Yale L. J. 1240 (1934).
107 Id., 1240.
108 Id.
109 Id., 1242.
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his argument, really a nice compendium of arguments against Realism generally, boils
down to this. Law cannot be facts because then we would have to teach facts not rules in
law school, study facts as the science of law, and be unable to distinguish fact from law for
purposes of charging a jury or limiting appellate jurisdiction. Similarly legal science cannot
be empirical because if it were, judges could never decide new cases for there would be no
experience to guide him, new statutes could not be interpreted and clear rules such as
"the rule of the Constitution that the President must be 35 years of age could not be law,
and it would, therefore, not be unconstitutional to make Colonel Lindbergh President".110
The reductio ad absurdum, recognized by the author as such, conceals an important point.
From an internal perspective, from that of the judge or jurist, though not necessarily the
lawyer, the external, critical perspective made no sense. To look at the rule of law, at the
rule theory of law, as a fact and not as a norm was to break its power. To do so sundered
the unity between the work of the judge and the jurist, a unity that was part of the
attraction to legal science for the academic lawyer, and, equally importantly, part of his
claim to a special role as the expositor of legal science, as a German legal academic, even
of the party of the left, could quite readily see. It was, in fact, not just the end of that claim,
but the more importantly of the coherent professional identity carefully forged but a
generation before. That would not do. That threatened the quiet progress of science.
What then of Realism? If it was so potent a critique as to demolish the whole idea of legal
science, why is it passe ? Why write of it as history rather than as current events? Well
there are the usual reasons, the conscription of many of its partisans into the
administrative and judicial apparatus of the New Deal, the death of others and the
continuing economic contraction of the Depression that cut budgets for research and
teaching innovation. More important, however, is a factor Kantorowicz wryly alludes to
when he speaks of the potential for cooperation between American and German jurists as
a result of "present events in Germany, like the even more memorable accomplishments of
the Turks in 1453" (the fall of Constantinople)."'
The rise of Fascism in Europe was paradoxically the fall of Realism in America. Criticisms of
Realism for its interest in the "is", in the outside, empiricist understanding of the law,
rather than the "ought", the insider perspective of legal science, led to claims that Realism
was a positivism in which whatever was the law was acceptable law.112 Put to one side the
obvious objection that the entire point to the empiricist thrust of Realism was to
110 Id., 1251.
ill Id., 1253.
112 EDWARD PURCELL, THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973) lays out
the entire literature which ranges from the serious and sensible, LON FULLER, LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940), to the
silly and offensive Philip Mechem, The Jurisprudence of Despair, 21 IOWA L. REV. 669 (1936).
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understand how the law was in fact working in order to provide a secure basis for criticism
and, ultimately, reform; put to one side the objection that legal science had, in fact, been
more supportive of existing law and that it relied primarily on a relatively weak and limited
tool for criticism and reform - logic. The anti-Realist criticism was made in law, as in other
fields, and in the face of a thoroughly positivist and increasingly obviously evil regime in
Germany and of the revelations about Stalinist repression in Russia that tainted all left
politics in a way that even the Spanish Civil War could not redeem, the criticism stuck.
Llewellyn and others began back tracking, began turning to safer projects like contracts
and the commercial code; the Catholic law school right wing began to be heard; and then,
all at once, everything was over as America dived into World War II.
C. Post War Developments 1945-1965
During the War, the law schools virtually shut down. Many schools enrolled no more
than half a dozen students in a class. Many small private schools, largely ones with
unaccredited part-time programs, closed, never to reopen. When the war was over, the
surviving schools were flooded with students, most all of whom were entitled to G.I. Bill
educational assistance. The accredited law schools, particularly the state schools, took this
occasion to rise to their patriotic duty, even to the extent of expanding enrollments above
pre-war levels and of offering year round, no summer vacation, two year programs so that
"the boys" could "catch up". No sooner had this influx of students begun to wind down,
when the onset of the Korean War guaranteed the continued existence of G.I. Bill students
and funds. The result was that by increasing enrollment and using a government subsidy to
reduce cost, the elite and not so elite accredited law schools both paid for the costs of
higher standards - four years of college was now the universal norm, larger faculties and
libraries an affordable fixture - and simultaneously kept most of the closed law schools
from reopening and drove most of the remaining unaccredited schools out of business. In
almost all cases state legislation ratified these events. By 1950 potential law students were
faced with a clearly socially stratified ladder of options for law school with the bottom rung
the few remaining part-time night programs, followed by the joint night and day programs,
then the weaker, exclusively day, state and private programs that graded imperceptibly
into the most elite of such programs, all private schools - Harvard, Yale and Columbia. And,
whatever the choice available to him, the student was served up pretty much an identical
curriculum, centered on the great, private common law subjects that had made up the
curriculum before the World War 1.
Had nothing changed? Well, the practice of law had changed and changed significantly
with the late New Deal and immediate post-war growth of the statutory specialties - labor,
securities, taxation, anti-trust, trade regulation, and general regulatory practices. The
u1 All of this paragraph and much of the next are derived from R. Stevens, see, supra, note 26, 205-231.
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upper-division curriculum reflected this change somewhat, as did the more occasional
appearance of other basics like corporate finance, estate planning and zoning and of
esoteric seminars like communication law. And, in the old common law courses, if one
listened closely, one heard a new language spoken. Legal rules, still the staple of classroom
discussion, were no longer justified on the grounds of their logical relationship with other
rules or principles. Yes, that hierarchical system of justification was gone. Instead, what
one heard in classrooms was talk about the policy behind the rules, each rule taken on its
own. It was as if, in Duncan Kennedy's words, "the temple had been torn down and in its
place was put a well manicured lawn. All rules were equal and all were one inch high".114
How this had happened, how a bastard form of sociological jurisprudence triumphed, is a
still obscure story, but the central clue, I wish to suggest, can be found in the failure of a
coherent program for reform put forth in an often cited (but surely largely unread for it is
largely unreadable), article published by Harold Lasswell, a famous political scientist, and
Myres McDougal, an early defender of Realism, but of a younger generation: Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest.115 The point of the
article was to lay out a plan for "refashioning ancient educational practices to serve
insistent contemporary needs", work to be done immediately so as to be in place when the
war was over. With an explicit desire to clarify "fundamental issues", the authors
asserted directly, "the proper function of our law school is ... to contribute to the training
of policy-makers for the ever more complete achievement of democratic values that
constitute the professed ends of the American polity".117 And why was this so?
"[D]emocratic values have been on the wane in recent years. The dominant trends of
world politics have been away from the symbols and practices of a free society and toward
the slogans, doctrines and structures of despotism".118 Lawyers could be blamed for this
reversal of fortune because they are, "even when not ... a 'maker' of policy, the one
indispensible adviser of every responsible policy-maker of our society".119 And the
prescription for reform was nothing short of total. "[A]n adequate training must therefore
include experiences that aid the developing lawyer to acquire certain skills of thought: goal
thinking, trend-thinking and scientific thinking. The student needs to clarify his moral
values ...; he needs to orient himself to past trends and future probabilities; finally, he
114 Duncan disowns ever having said this. The attribution is nevertheless correct and stealing someone else's
metaphor, even a disowned metaphor, is a high crime.
us Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public
Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 205 (1943)
116 Id., 203.
117 Id., 206.
118 Id., 207.
119 Id., 208.
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needs to acquire the scientific knowledge and skills necessary to implement objectives
within the context of contemporary trends".120 And to implement this objective, Laswell
and McDougal proposed a complete curriculum reform away from the doctrinal
organization and toward organization by focus on influential policy-makers, values and
skills.
The details of the scheme are essentially unimportant for present purposes. No law school
has ever even proposed to adopt it. What is important to notice is that an explicitly radical
piece coming out of the Realist ethos at Yale chose to yoke Poundian sociological
jurisprudence to Realist empiricism and cover the entire package with democratic values.
As a paper strategy the idea was nothing short of genius. Reverse the association of
Realism with despotism by explicitly embracing, indeed trumpeting, democratic values.
Unfortunately, neither author had done their trend thinking carefully. What sold instead
can be seen in a little piece by Barton Leach of Harvard, critical of McDougal's efforts in a
property casebook, called Property Law in Two Packages.121
Leach saw two objectives to legal education - to prepare lawyers "to assume direction of
all phases of the areas of personal conflict inherent in a complex society and economy" and
"to provide a very large proportion of national leadership at all levels of authority".122 With
these suitably modest goals came a suitably modest assessment of the then current scene.
"[T]here is no basis for claiming that legal education has failed and that practically anything
would be better than what we have now. On the contrary it has been generally successful.
Everything possible should be done to increase its effectiveness, but great care should be
taken to assure that novel expedients supplement existing values and do not destroy
them".123 Thus, in contrast to McDougal's attempt to get a first year student to make an
"evaluation of our system of property on the basis of its attainment of sociological and
political values", 124 Leach wished to "give the student a professional equipment which will
enable him to perform the real-estate side of a general law practice". 1 25 The layout of the
entire course proposed by Leach emphasized the doctrinal considerations to practice,
stripped of their systematic attributes such as Beale would have found essential, and as for
policy, it was relegated to an appropriately limited role. "If a member of the bar litigates
the validity of a covenant or condition restricting the use of land without considering the
consequences to the community of this type of restriction, he will be giving his client very
120 Id., 212.
121 Barton Leach, Property Law in Two Packages, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 28 (1948)
122 Id., 29.
123 Id., 30.
124 Id., 38.
125 Id., 41.
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bad representation. On the other hand, if he draws a will for a Rockefeller ... while
reflecting on the inequalities of the distribution of wealth, he is not likely to do the best job
of which he is capable".126
What Lasswell and McDougal failed to understand was that after the War and its
dislocations, the trend was not in the direction of more leftish democracy, but in the
direction of privatism, reestablishing nuclear families disrupted by war on new suburban
lawns, reestablishing traditional understandings of the lawyer and his work (it was one
must remember in the era of Norman Rockwell with his romantic lens soft focused on Mid-
America), and reestablishing traditional ideologies, purged of their foreign elements. It was
a replay of the aftermath of World War 1, a deeply conservative reaction, and not the
continuation of the Second New Deal. Law followed that line as well. The logical edifice
was gone, but, where doctrine gave out, only the most ad hoc, lawyerly policy intervened
... security of transactions, protection of the family, antagonism to welschers,
compensation for losses ... the status quo writ in traditional lawyers' terms and writ small.
Lasswell and McDougal may have better understood what was happening to legal practice
than Leach, but Leach knew what would sell. Pound had been victorious, but only after
having been stripped of even the mildly critical bite that he had begun with.
The only significant attempt at theoretical understanding of law in these years was that
produced by Lon Fullerl27 and Henry Hartl28. For both of these men the emphasis was on
privateness, on the primacy of the private ordering of private matters and on the thus
supplementary role of the State, primarily in aid of those private orderings. On the
question of the justification of rules, an explicit, direct justification was never offered. In
some ways that fact is curious for no one would claim that the question of democratic
values was far from anyone's mind. Indeed, Fuller was obsessed with the question of how
to distinguish a "free" from a "totalitarian" legal system. However, the answer given to the
basic question of justification paralleled the answers given elsewhere. A decision was
justified when made by the body traditionally appropriate to render such a decision using
materials traditionally appropriate to the task by means of traditionally appropriate
techniques. The high school civics notion of American government - the legislature makes
the laws, the judiciary interprets them, and the executive enforces them - had triumphed.
Of course, it was dressed up in many ways, most significantly with the notion that each of
these institutions had specific, specialized institutional competencies that, if followed,
would help assure a proper result. The judiciary, the critical piece in the system, had as its
126 Id., 31.
127 Here there is no great book. The best entr6 into the mass of writings are two essays: Kenneth Winston,
Introduction, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth Winston ed. 1981) and
Peter Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (1986).
128 HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958)
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special competency the resolution of private disputes centered around "what happened"
and made its necessary decisions filling in the interstices between existing norms by, as
every student of spoiled cantaloupes knew,129 the careful examination of the available
legal materials, traditionally conceived, extended in line with their purposes, traditionally
understood, by means of the technique of "reasoned (i.e., purposeful) elaboration".
Thinking like a lawyer had triumphed again.
This school of thought, accurately dubbed the legal process school,1o thus came to assert
that democratic values are to be found not in the actual outcomes of decisions, as the
Realists had by their critique implicitly claimed and as Laswell and McDougal had directly
stated, but in the process of democratic institutions behaving appropriately. All was for the
best in this reasonably decent of all possible worlds, if the system was left to behave pretty
much as it traditionally had done. And so, the twin problems of authoritative premises and
determinate technique had been realigned so that process guaranteed both - working
correctly the system provided the premises and was the technique. Process was thus much
like legal science had been fifty years before when it provided both the premises and was
the technique.
D. Contemporary Chaos 1965-
In retrospect the sleight of hand was dazzling. Its purpose, beyond fitting with a dominant
conservatism, is less obvious, so I wish to put that question off for a bit. What is obvious is
that the trick was discovered quite quickly. Curiously, the important event took place at
the height of the dominance of process thinking. The first Sputnik satellite convinced
Americans that our educational system was sluggish or worse. In the name of an
improvement in science and technology education, accelerated classes, tracking, advanced
placement and other educational nostrums were foisted upon the post-war baby-boom
generation and their war-time siblings. Debates about what the program did for science
and technology remain, but for the law the program generated a great number of students
trained to question accustomed understandings of the society in their high school classes
and in their college work in the humanities and social sciences. These were the flower
children of Woodstock and HAIR. Social policies, brought to the fore in the Kennedy and
early Johnson years, especially the civil rights struggles and the war on poverty, added to
the questioning that was finally brought to a divisive head in the fight over continuing the
Vietnam War. As in the case of each previous war, its termination brought a conservative
drawing in that is in evidence yet today.
129 The first problem in the Hart & Sacks material is "the Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes".
13o Bruce Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 DAEDALUS 119, 123 and see, supra, note 26.
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In the law schools much the same pattern could be seen. The arrival of the baby boomers
led to the establishment of more new law schools than at any time period since before
World War 1. Even with the increase in law schools, however, the demographic pressure
firmly turned the now ubiquitous LSAT into the major screening device for entry into the
legal profession. Curiously the conjunction of the reinstitution of the draft for law students
during the Vietnam War and the rising feminist movement brought large numbers of
females into the pool of applicants for the first time; this addition to the pool succeeded in
raising demographic pressure beyond what would otherwise have been expected and
managed to prolong that pressure, indeed to mask its decline, until quite recently. The
decline of the GI Bill as a financing device led to the creation of large pools of subsidized
and unsubsidized government assembled funds that were used to finance the education of
an increasing percentage of students, creating for the first time an entire class of students
who left law school substantially in debt rather than simply penniless. The concomitant
increase in the pressure to find well-paying jobs was understandable and luckily, through
the early eighties, employment of lawyers was in fact growing as fast or faster than that
pressure. Then, the conservative reaction among students set in as jobs became relatively
scarce and employers exercised their penchant for wanting their legal education recreated
in their employees.
Inside the law schools chaos reigned, not the creative chaos of the so-called student
revolution, though briefly, at some places, there was some of that, but intellectual chaos.
Required courses decreased in numbers and, in the once sacred first year, in length. In
their place electives and seminars of every kind, stripe and color bloomed, not that the
students necessarily took them. Students seem, in fact, not to have used their electives to
stray much beyond the former required curriculum, a fact that bothered many faculty.132
Clinical studies appeared almost everywhere, fueled primarily with Ford Foundation
money at the outset and then by student interest, initially in relevant learning, a code word
for giving legal assistance to the poor, then later in the understandable hope on the part of
those whose were not very good at law school's intellectual games that they might
nevertheless be good at practice. No one knew exactly where clinic fit in to a legal
education that for years had been clinical only in the most artificial sense. Skills training
was proffered as a rationale, but that didn't work well in a world in which litigation, the
staple of most clinical programs, was effectively a lost art form; the common alternative
rationale - the union of theory and practice - was no better since the practices available in
clinics had little to do with any of the law school's more prominent batches of theory or
with the office practice most students would enter. Somehow the most plausible
justification - a place for bored third year students to hang out - was undercut by the
relatively high cost of such education.
1 Again I steal from R. Stevens, supra, note 26, at 232-63.
132 DONALD JACKSON & E. GORDON GEE, BREAD AND BUTTER: ELECTIVES IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1975).
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Intellectually chaos reigned too. Legal Process was put to sleep in the sixties and early
seventies when it became clear that as a jurisprudence, it could neither explain Brown v.
Board of Education, the most obviously correct major decision by the Supreme Court of the
Twentieth century, nor support the Warren Court's rulings in the areas of criminal
procedure and legislative apportionment. Nothing, however, came to replace legal process
in the classroom, beyond the soft, warm, but thin blanket that was policy analysis. And
even policy analysis came under fire as both left in the form of the Critical Legal Studies
movement, and right, in the form of the Law and Economics movement, tried some serious
policy analysis from well articulated premises which showed that the standard issue variety
was shoddy at best.
At a higher level of intellectual activity, matters may even have been worse. For the first
time a significant portion of the intellectual elite among law professors actually possessed
more than a nodding acquaintance with a discipline other than law. At one level, the result
was the proliferation of a specialized journals like the Journal of Law and Economics and
the Law and Society Review. At another level, it meant that the regular law reviews were
filled with material that much of the academic profession and most of the practicing
profession found increasingly unintelligible. For narrow sub-disciplines - history, sociology
and economics come readily to mind - the result was a veritable explosion of literature.
But even here there were problems. The economists increasingly produced right and
liberal versions of the same material and the historians, liberal and left versions, thus only
adding to the cacophony. And, at the level of grand intellectual achievements, many trees
were felled to make much paper but just listing the authors (alphabetically to avoid some
affront) Ackerman, Dworkin, Ely, Posner, Rawls, Tribe and Unger, makes it clear that there
is no dominant school of legal theory in the late twentieth century anymore than there is a
dominant idea beyond the chaos elsewhere in the law school.
E. Chaos Explained
Why is that so? To answer that question, I wish to go back to where I left off a bit ago, to
the question as to what exactly was the purpose for the intellectual juggling that was Fuller
and Hart.
Politics can explain much about law; after all LAW IS POLITICS as I have said, somewhat
133aphoristically, before. The intellectual conservatism of Fuller and Hart mirrored the
political conservatism of the late forties and fifties. So too the total political fragmentation
of the seventies and eighties is mirrored in the law schools. But politics cannot explain
everything. Look at Lasswell and McDougal for example. It is by no means obvious to me
133 John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on
Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 411 (1984).
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that their scheme of democratic values cannot be turned to quite conservative purposes.
Indeed, it is notable that on the one key political issue of the fifties, - McCarthyite anti-
communism - the more obviously conservative Harvard types compiled a far better record
than their ostensibly more liberal brethren at Yale where individuals deemed to be too left
134were simply denied tenure. Yet, Harvard style legal process caught on. To understand
why that was so, I think that one has only to look at the two visions of legal education and
ask, "Who can teach the stuff?"
Harvard's version could be taught only by lawyers; Yale's was more ambiguous. In fact, it
was taught only by lawyers; in theory sociologists might have done as well, economists
could have surely helped, as could have social psychologists. That was Realism's problem
as well. The facts about law and legal institutions need not have been gathered by lawyers.
Indeed, they might well better have been gathered by others. But what then of the law
professor; what of his professional identity, his place in the division of labor? Fuller and
Hart answered that question quite easily. The law professor was a specialist in
understanding legal process, in legal procedure. Just like Langdell's private law curriculum,
no one else in the academy knew anything about technical legal procedure nor did they
want to learn. The law professor's professional identity, so patiently forged before World
War 1, was safe, and so the law professors quite easily preferred Leach's road.
Of course, Realism destroyed that identity once before by blasting law out of its doctrinal
box. That is why it was so threatening, why Pound reacted so strongly to "some of our
younger teachers of law".135 Like Wittgenstein's hypothetical parent for whom shooting
craps was not playing a game, denying the centrality of the rules was not what sociological
jurisprudence was all about; it was simply a new way of justifying the rules. And ultimately,
it was Realism that destroyed Legal Process jurisprudence as well. The move, in the now
fashionable phrase, was simple to any Realist. Procedures are not neutral; any lawyer
knows that. At best, they are tools that are used for substantive ends; at worst they are
tools that by their very existence make certain substantive ends more likely, as modern
pre-trial practice makes it more likely that wealthy parties will bleed poor parties through
the cost of discovery. Process solved nothing. And ultimately it is Realism that can be
blamed for the intellectual chaos of today. The cries of the old people about "lost
standards" and the danger to a law school of "a professional faculty that has lost interest in
most of the work of its alumni",136 show quite clearly the lack of any continuing
professional identity to the law professor outside of the admittedly trivial one of being able
to parse a case.
134 See, LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE (1986).
135 Nathan Roscoe Pound, The Callfor a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 706 (1931)
136 Paul Carrington, The Dangers of the Graduate School Model, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 11, 12 (1986)
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Now, of course, one can trace the malady back to Ames' action in giving up the teaching of
substantive law as the object of law school and substituting therefore "thinking like a
lawyer". But in truth the substitution was a phoney one. Law School didn't teach its
students to think like lawyers. Lawyers don't think like that. They think in quite concrete,
instrumental terms. Law school taught students doctrine pure and simple and incidentally,
but only incidentally, how it got manipulated. It taught law from the inside. Realism moved
outside the box of doctrine and looked in; at that moment it broke open the academic
lawyer's identity.
F. Reflection
One of the funniest things Bob Gordon ever said was at a New Year's Eve Party on 31
December 1975 when with the stroke of twelve, in mock sadness, he sighed, "Ah, Schlegel
Le fin du siecle!" The professional legal academic in the Langdellian mode is approaching
one hundred years old. He, now finally he and sometimes she, is a creature of the first fin
du siecle. That was a time like the present when political life was hardly secure and
orderly. Indeed, there were real socialists in the woods then, real anarchists, real trade
unionists. It was order that was being searched for in those days as Robert Wiebe so aptly
137noticed. One of those pieces of order that emerged was law and professors. Is similar
order likely to emerge again from this in many ways less conflicted political climate or has
Realism killed that possibility? In a world where there are semioticians to explain about
language and economists to explain about markets, psychologists and sociologists to
explain about people and political scientists to explain about government, philosophers to
explain about theory and anthropologists to explain about culture, and lawyers, real
practicing lawyers, to give real apprenticeship training is there any need for law
professors? I do not propose to answer that question but only to note that its answer,
which will come in time, will help answer the more basic question, "What was Realism?"
Realism, that quintessentially professorial movement, created the problem for its own
class, which I have explored in order to help bring you to an understanding of itself. A
snake swallowing its tail? Perhaps.
13 ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER (1967)
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